Nominal Rigidities in Wage Setting by Rational Trade Unions
构建模型，证明理性工会在面对实际和货币冲击时，即使能完全隔离名义扰动，也会理性选择不这样做，从而在工资设定中产生名义刚性。
Many rational wage setting schemes, such as the trade unions paradigm, are usually thought to lead to pure real rigidities. In this article we construct a model where a rational trade union without any kind of money illusion sets wage schedules in an economy subject to real and monetary shocks. We make the realistic assumption that wages can be conditioned on prices. It is found that, although the trade union has the option of fully insulating workers from nominal disturbances, it will rationally choose not to do so, and therefore nominal rigidities will be present in the economy.