Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services
研究信息不对称如何影响专家型卖家的市场组织，分析顾客搜寻多个意见和声誉机制对专家行为的约束，并探讨搜寻诊断成本对市场结构的影响。
This article investigates how information asymmetries affect the organization of markets in which sellers are also experts who determine customers' needs. It examines how customers' search for multiple opinions and reputation considerations each play a role in disciplining experts. It shows that customer search may give rise to an equilibrium in which experts specialize in different levels of the service. It discusses the effect of the search-cum-diagnosis costs on the market's organization. experts are more likely to be disciplined by customer search or by reputation according to whether these costs are lower or higher. It also shows that when experts are liable to make diagnosis errors, there is a negative search externality that tends to raise prices.