Dynamic competition in deceptive markets
研究了企业通过设计合同利用消费者错误的市场中，企业通过观察客户使用模式获取信息，发现关于消费者天真程度的私人信息即使产品同质也能缓解竞争，且教育天真消费者会进一步弱化竞争。
Abstract In many deceptive markets, firms design contracts to exploit mistakes of naive consumers. These contracts also attract less‐profitable sophisticated consumers. I study such markets when firms compete repeatedly. By observing their customers' usage patterns, firms acquire private information about their level of naiveté. First, I find that private information on naiveté mitigates competition and is of great value even with homogeneous products. Second, competition between initially symmetrically informed firms is mitigated when firms can educate naifs about mistakes. In an analogous setting without naifs, the second result does not occur; the first result occurs when firms cannot disclose fees.