Independent Directors and Favoritism: When Multiple Board Affiliations Prevail in Mutual Fund Families
研究了拥有多重董事会任职的独立董事是否会在基金家族内偏袒某些基金，还是通过提升董事会专业水平使所有基金股东受益。基于2002-2008年55家基金赞助商的数据，发现这类独立董事减少了基金间的业绩和资源转移，降低了费用，并促进了信息共享。
I examine whether independent directors with multiple board affiliations (IDMAs) trade off the interests of one fund relative to another (fund favoritism) or whether they benefit fund shareholders by increasing the level of the board's expertise. Using a sample of mutual funds affiliated with the top 55 fund sponsors from 2002 to 2008, I find that the presence of IDMAs is negatively related to performance/resource shifting across funds within fund families. IDMAs appear to decrease fund fees, increase the return gap associated with the unobserved actions of fund managers, and facilitate the transfer of information across funds in a fund family.