INFLATION TARGETING WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION*
在不完全承诺技术的全球博弈框架下，研究发现低通胀目标难以实现，且较弱的央行需要设定更高目标，而降低透明度反而有助于增强目标可信度并降低最优目标水平。
In a global games setup with imperfect commitment technology, we show that low targets—the ones close to the optimal inflation under perfect commitment—are unattainable, leading to a trade‐off between low and credible targets. Moreover, since noisy public information helps to coordinate expectations around the announced target, our article supports unconventional policy prescriptions. First, weaker countries need to impose higher targets. Second, less transparency helps to make the announced target credible and then reduces the optimally announced target. Results are based on a general central bank loss function encompassing models traditionally used to discuss central bank decisions.