Bargaining and Wage Rigidity in a Matching Model for the US
用稳健计量方法重新评估了Mortensen-Pissarides匹配模型的实证结果，发现假设所有工资每期重新谈判与美国工资的历史依赖性不符，而工作变动者工资灵活、工作稳定者工资刚性的设定能更好拟合数据。
Abstract This paper uses robust econometric methods to assess previous empirical results for the Mortensen and Pissarides ( ) matching model. Assuming all wages are negotiated each period is inconsistent with the history dependence in US wages, even allowing for heterogeneous match productivities, time to build vacancies and credible bargaining. Flexible wages for job changers, with rigid wages for job stayers, allows the model to capture this history dependence and is not inconsistent with parameter calibrations in the literature. Such wage rigidity affects only the timing of wage payments over the duration of matches; conclusions about other characteristics are unaffected by it.