Executive Entrenchment in Founder‐Managed Firms: An Empirical Study from China
利用1999-2007年中国企业面板数据，研究企业绩效、股权集中度、董事会独立性和行业竞争对创始人及非创始人高管被解雇可能性的影响，发现创始人高管存在固守现象。
We study the relationship between past firm performance, ownership concentration, board independence, and industry competition on the likelihood of dismissal for both founder and nonfounder executives using a panel data set of Chinese founded firms during 1999–2007. Results indicate a persistent presence of entrenchment of founder executives. Compared with the founder, the nonfounder executive is more likely to be dismissed following periods of poor firm performance combined with ownership concentration and board independence except under high levels of industry competition when founder executives are more likely to be held accountable through dismissal by independent boards.