Governance and managerial effort in consumer-owned enterprises
构建了一个政治经济学模型，分析消费者所有制企业中董事会与管理层的关系，揭示治理结构如何影响管理层权力，并探讨薪酬与治理资源之间的权衡。
This article develops a political economy model of the board–manager relationship in consumer-owned enterprises (COEs), illustrating how the governance structure plays a key role in determining managerial power. The key conclusion of the article is that managerial remuneration and the resources devoted to governance are strategic choices for the COE and that their determination involves a trade-off. This trade-off depends on factors external to the COE, such as the COE's time horizon (as captured in the discount rate) and the manager's opportunity cost outside the COE (e.g. the remuneration paid in investor-owned firms). The trade-off also is influenced by the degree of complementarity between remuneration and governance resources, and by the sensitivity of managerial utility to financial remuneration and to governance.