通过灵活性实现僵化:灵活劳动力与管理官僚制的兴起

Rigidities through flexibility: flexible labour and the rise of management bureaucracies

Cambridge Journal of Economics · 2015
被引 36
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

研究发现,雇佣大量灵活工人的组织拥有更高比例的管理人员,表明劳动力市场灵活性损害信任与忠诚,导致管理官僚化,进而可能抑制创新与生产率增长。

Abstract

Judging from organisation-level survey data, we find that organisations employing high shares of flexible workers have higher shares of managers in their personnel. This is in line with earlier findings that Anglo-Saxon countries with deregulated labour markets have thicker management bureaucracies than countries with more regulated labour markets of the ‘Rhineland’ style. We argue that flexibility in labour markets (i.e. easier firing and higher labour turnover) damages trust, loyalty and commitment. This requires more management and control . Related research suggests that easy hire and fire is at the cost of organisational learning, knowledge accumulation and knowledge sharing, thus damaging innovation and labour productivity growth.

灵活用工管理层官僚化劳动力市场放松管制组织信任