Why Mortgage Borrowers Persevere: An Explanation of First and Second Lien Performance Mismatch
研究了同一房产上的一顺位和二顺位抵押贷款表现不一致的现象，发现稳定权益且面临暂时流动性冲击的借款人会选择性还款，而负权益且严重财务压力的借款人则会双重违约。
Borrowers with a pair of mortgages collateralized by the same property sometimes continue to make payments on one while defaulting on the other. We articulate a framework for understanding this performance mismatch that emphasizes two types of borrowers: those with stable equity positions who perceive they are facing moderate or temporary liquidity shocks, and those facing severe financial stress in combination with negative equity. The former have an incentive to enter mismatch and subsequently cure, while the latter would default on both contracts. Our empirical analysis using newly available, national samples of matched first‐ and second‐lien mortgages supports this view.