Reputation Effects in Trading on the New York Stock Exchange
研究发现纽约证券交易所股票交易楼层搬迁时，流动性成本上升，且逆向选择严重、经纪人更替多的股票上升更明显；随迁经纪人交易成本低于未迁或新入经纪人，表明声誉在流动性提供中起重要作用。
ABSTRACT Theory suggests that reputations allow nonanonymous markets to attenuate adverse selection in trading. We identify instances in which New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks experience trading floor relocations. Although specialists follow the stocks to their new locations, most brokers do not. We find a discernable increase in liquidity costs around a stock's relocation that is larger for stocks with higher adverse selection and greater broker turnover. We also find that floor brokers relocating with the stock obtain lower trading costs than brokers not moving and brokers beginning trading post‐move. Our results suggest that reputation plays an important role in the NYSE's liquidity provision process.