Executive Stock Options Compensation: An Empirical Analysis Of Determinants In Portugal
研究葡萄牙40家上市公司2003-2006年数据，发现公司规模、管理层持股、非执行董事占比和风险水平会提高股票期权授予概率，而董事会规模与期权授予呈非线性负相关。
This study investigates the determinants of stock options attribution. The study hy-pothesizes that the equity held by managers, the board composition, the board size, the dividend policy, the leverage, the firm risk, the liquidity constraints, the firm size and the firm performance are related to the firm’s attribution of stock options. Using a lon-gitudinal data on 40 listed firms from Portugal for the period 2003 to 2006, the study finds that the probability of granting stock options increases with the firms’ size and managerial ownership. This probability also increases when the board is composed of mostly non-executive directors and when firms show levels of risk. Additionally, results suggest a non-linear negative relationship between board size and stock options attribution. Keywords: Agency Theory; Incentives; Stock Options.