量化反卡特尔执法的威慑效应

QUANTIFYING THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF ANTICARTEL ENFORCEMENT

Economic Inquiry · 2018
被引 10
ABS 3

中文导读

尝试量化反卡特尔政策的威慑效应,通过概念框架和来自合法卡特尔的数据估算,发现至少一半的潜在损害被威慑,是已发现损害的七倍。

Abstract

This paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anticartel policy. It develops a conceptual framework, which establishes the sort of information necessary for such quantification. This is then illustrated and calibrated by drawing upon existing literatures and using evidence from legal cartels to approximate what would be observed absent policy. Measuring impact by the proportion of all potential harm that is deterred, our best estimate is two‐thirds and, even on conservative assumptions, at least half of all harms (or seven times the detected harm) is deterred.

反垄断执法经济学公共经济学法律经济学