A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities
提出一种无货币转移的伪市场机制，用于基于优先级（如学校选择）的不可分割物品分配。代理人获得代币并面对优先级特定价格，购买效用最大化的随机分配。该机制渐近激励相容，分配公平且受约束帕累托有效。
We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Hylland and Zeckhauser’s (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on incentives and fairness are also new in their classical setting.