HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN THE PRESENCE OF CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
在伯特兰-埃奇沃思模型中研究两家竞争对手的合并，发现合并的价格效应取决于产能约束的松紧程度；当合并使紧约束变松时，价格上升，即使总产能不变。
We examine a merger between two competitors in a Bertrand‐Edgeworth model. We find that the effects of merger depend on the tightness of capacity constraints. The combination of two firms has no price effect if and only if the capacity constraints of all firms are binding both before and after the merger. However, a merger may turn a binding capacity constraint into a slack one, which results in higher prices. In an industry where excess capacity drives the premerger prices of all firms to the marginal cost, a merger may cause prices to rise even though aggregate capacity remains constant.