是改变想法还是改变关注点?政治中选择反转的理论

A Change of Mind or a Change of Focus? A Theory of Choice Reversals in Politics<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1"><sup>*</sup></xref>

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · 1994
被引 16
ABS 4

中文导读

本文提出选择反转的第三种解释:偏好是多维的,决策情境变化会导致注意力突然转移,从而引起选择不一致,而非偏好不稳定或非理性。

Abstract

Most models of choice treat decisions as if they occur but once. But people are continually making choices, and often they are asked to make similar choices at different times. It is not unusual to find choice reversals, in which a choice made at one time is reversed at another. Even if choice reversals do not occur, because exactly similar choices seldom recur, great inconsistencies in choice across time are readily observable. To explain such inconsistencies, it seems that we must postulate either a rapid change in preferences or irrationality (not making a choice based on one's preferences). This article explores a third alternative: that preferences are multidimensional, and that attentiveness to preferences can shift abruptly as the decisional context changes. Shifts in attentiveness, rather than instability in preferences or irrationality, often account for choice inconsistencies. Great inconsistencies in choice may result from fluctuating attention. Herbert Simon

政治学行为经济学决策理论心理学