Diffusing Coordination Risk
研究在制度变迁博弈中，通过动态信息披露（如生存测试）来阻止代理人攻击，并应用于借款人通过分散到期日来消除恐慌性挤兑。
In a regime change game, privately informed agents sequentially decide whether to attack without observing others’ previous actions. To dissuade them from attacking, a principal adopts a dynamic information disclosure policy, frequent viability tests. A viability test publicly discloses whether the regime has survived the previous attacks. When such tests are sufficiently frequent, in the unique cutoff equilibrium, agents never attack if the regime passes the latest test, regardless of their private signals. We apply this theory to demonstrate that a borrower can eliminate panic-based runs by sufficiently diffusing the rollover choices across different maturity dates.