Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China
研究中国股市三项旨在加强中小股东保护的监管改革对财富的影响，发现治理较弱的企业在公告期间有显著更高的异常回报，而政治关联强的企业未受益，表明中小股东预期监管不会对这类企业严格执行。
Abstract We examine the wealth effects of 3 regulatory changes designed to improve minority-shareholder protection in the Chinese stock markets. Using the value of a firm’s related-party transactions as an inverse proxy for the quality of corporate governance, wefind that firms with weaker governance experienced significantly larger abnormal returns around announcements of the new regulations than did firms with stronger governance. We also find that firms with strong ties to the government did not benefit from the regulations, suggesting that minority shareholders did not expect regulators to enforce the new rules on firms where blockholders have strong political connections.