Micro to Macro: Optimal Trade Policy With Firm Heterogeneity
研究了在异质性企业自我选择出口的背景下，一国单边征收贸易税以最大化国内福利的最优政策，发现应补贴最不盈利的外国企业，而非补贴或征税于最不盈利的本国企业。
The empirical observation that “large firms tend to export, whereas small firms do not” has transformed the way economists think about the determinants of international trade. Yet, it has had surprisingly little impact on how economists think about trade policy. Under very general conditions, we show that from the point of view of a country that unilaterally imposes trade taxes to maximize domestic welfare, the self‐selection of heterogeneous firms into exports calls for import subsidies on the least profitable foreign firms. In contrast, our analysis does not provide any rationale for export subsidies or taxes on the least profitable domestic firms.