Performance Budgeting: Incentives and Social Waste From Window Dressing
研究公共部门绩效预算中，不完美的绩效指标如何激励资金接受者进行社会浪费性的粉饰行为，并分析其效率提升与社会浪费之间的权衡。
Performance budgeting schemes in the public sector have to operate with imperfect performance measures. We argue that these imperfections generate incentives for the potential recipients of performance-based funds to use up resources in socially wasteful window dressing. Using a theoretical model, we analyze the trade-off between the efficiency-enhancing effect of performance budgeting (PB) and the social waste it induces. We show that the social waste from window dressing may outweigh the gains from PB. This social waste provides an explanation for the mixed empirical evidence concerning the impact of PB on public sector performance. We provide first guidance on how to assess window dressing and its consequences in future empirical studies.