资产所有者与资产管理人:另类资产中的代理成本与信息不对称

Asset Owners versus Asset Managers: Agency Costsand Asymmetries of Information in Alternative Assets

The Journal of Portfolio Management · 2012
被引 11
ABS 3

中文导读

研究了资产所有者与资产管理人之间的利益冲突如何导致四种代理成本:技能或阿尔法不对称、激励不对称、流动性不对称和风险承担不对称。

Abstract

Agency theory is about striking the right balance between principals and their agents. In any agency relationship, the motives and desires of the agent may be different from that of the principal. For public corporations, agency theory is often called corporate governance. There is a growing awareness, however, that agency theory also applies to the investment management industry in which asset owners delegate the caretaking of their investments to asset managers. The potential misalignment of interests between asset owners and asset managers can lead to four agency costs: asymmetry of skill or alpha, asymmetry of incentives, asymmetry of liquidity, and asymmetry of risk taking. <b>TOPICS:</b>Other real assets, fixed-income portfolio management, exchanges/markets/clearinghouses

代理理论公司治理投资管理另类资产