Salience and Social Security Benefits
利用挪威67-69岁工人的收入测试和社保累积机制中的拐点与断点，研究发现收入测试对劳动收入影响显著，而累积机制断点无显著效果，表明累积激励缺乏显著性。
We study the effect of salience in the social security benefit system on labor earnings by exploiting kinks and notches in budget lines introduced by earnings testing and social security accrual mechanisms for 67-69 year old workers in Norway. An earnings test had large effects on labor earnings, while an accrual system discontinuity had no discernible effects. We interpret the difference as likely to be caused by a lack of salience in the accrual incentives: agents are not able or willing to take into account the value of future benefit increases when considering the relevant rewards to working.