On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
研究不完全信息经济环境中哪些社会选择对应是可完全实施的，发现有效配置和核心配置不可实施，而理性预期均衡、无嫉妒配置和林达尔配置在特定条件下可实施。
This paper identifies several social choice correspondences which are or are not fully implementable in economic environments when agents are incompletely informed about the environment. We show that in contrast to results in the case of complete information, neither efficient allocations nor core allocations define implementable social choice correspondences. We also identify conditions under which the Rational Expectations Equilibrium correspondence is implementable. We extend the concepts of fair allocations and Lindahl allocations to economies with incomplete information, and show that envy-free allocations and Lindahl allocations are implementable under some conditions while fair allocations are not.