Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
研究了委托人如何最优地选择约束条件来限制参与拍卖的代理人，给出了简单预算约束成为最优合同的充分必要条件，并揭示了预算约束在模型中的应用及其与收入等价定理的关系。
I study a principal's optimal choice of constraint for an agent participating in an auction (or auction-like allocation mechanism). I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the principal's beliefs about the value of the item for a simple budget constraint to be the optimal contract. The results link the observed use of budget constraints to their use in models incorporating budget-constrained bidders. Other implications of the model are that a general revenue equivalence result applies and that the optimal auction with budget-constrained bidders has a standard solution analogous to the one for classic models.