Teachers’ Labor Market Responses to Performance Evaluation Reform: Experimental Evidence from Chicago Public Schools
利用芝加哥公立学校试点评价系统的随机实验，发现改革虽未整体影响教师离职，但增加了低评级和无任期教师的离职率，且离职教师绩效低于留任者及替代者，表明改革可促使低绩效教师退出并提升教师队伍质量。
Abstract Traditional teacher evaluation systems have come under scrutiny for not identifying, supporting, and, if necessary, removing low-performing teachers from the classroom. Leveraging the experimental rollout of a pilot evaluation system in Chicago, we find that, while there was no main effect of the pilot on teacher exit, the pilot system increased exit for low-rated and nontenured teachers. Furthermore, teachers who exited were lower performing than those who stayed and those who replaced them. These findings suggest that reformed evaluation systems can induce low-performing teachers to exit schools and may also improve the overall quality of the teacher labor force.