Tax Mix Corners and Other Kinks
研究了州级财政限制下地方税收组合的决定过程，解释了地方公共支出对转移支付过度敏感（即“粘蝇纸效应”）如何产生，并指出这不一定意味着地方政府支出过度。
This paper models the local tax mix determination process in the presence of statewide fiscal limitations—the decentralized government finance archetype—and shows how excess sensitivity of local public spending to grants (the conventionally and somewhat misleadingly termed “flypaper effect”) arises in the constrained tax mix irrespective of whether lower or upper limits bind and how it cannot, in general, be taken as a symptom of local government overspending. An empirical application to Italian province panel data provides consistent evidence of the role of corner solutions produced by two-sided tax limits in explaining the sensitivity of local public expenditures to grants.