Optimal Dissent in Organizations
理论探讨组织指挥链中“消极抵抗”的成本与收益，发现一定程度的异议有助于防止错误决策并增强命令可信度，且决策者私人信息越多，最优异议水平越高。研究应用于政府机构独立性和公司治理辩论。
This paper is a theoretical exploration on the costs and benefits of “pas-sive resistance” in the chain of command. In our model, the organization consists of two employees: an informed decision maker (she) in charge of selecting a project, and an uninformed implementer (he) in charge of its\nexecution. Both employees have intrinsic and possibly differing preferences over projects. Overall success depends on both project selection and its implementation.\nWe find that a certain level of disagreement in the chain of command may be useful to (1) prevent bad decisions from being taken and\n(2) give credibility to the accuracy of the decision maker’s orders. Hence, there is\nan optimal level of dissent in organizations, which is larger when the extent of the decision maker’s private information is higher.\nWe apply our analysis to two questions: (1) the political independence of government agencies and (2) the current debate on\ncorporate governance.