Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency
研究了买卖双方估值相互依存且有多单位供需的双向拍卖，提出一种新机制，满足事后激励相容、个体理性等性质，并在参与者数量增大时渐近达到竞争均衡效率。
We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multi-unit demand and supply. We propose a new mechanism that satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, nonwastefulness, and no budget deficit. Moreover, this mechanism is asymptotically efficient in that the trade outcome in the mechanism converges to the efficient level as in a competitive equilibrium as the numbers of the buyers and sellers become large. Our mechanism is the first double auction mechanism with these properties in the interdependent values setting.