The European Union Legislature as an Agent of the European Court of Justice
本文指出欧盟条约宪法化使立法机构受法院约束，形成委托-代理关系，法院可废除不符其偏好的立法，内部市场立法实为对先前判例的编纂，立法机构更像下级执行者而非自主决策者。
Abstract The European Union is unique among jurisdictions in having constitutionalized its policy goals and methods, by embedding these in the Treaties. As a result, the legislature is far more constrained in its activities than is the case in other constitutional orders. Yet the Treaties are indeterminate, and it is the Court of Justice which interprets and delimits them, and instructs the legislature on how and to what extent it may pursue them. There is, in substance, a principal–agent relationship between the Court and the EU legislature, enforceable by the Court's capacity to annul legislation contrary to its preferences. An examination of internal market legislation shows that indeed it consists of codification of prior case law. The judicial constraints on the EU legislature are sufficiently tight that the legislature is more akin to a subordinate implementing regulator than to an autonomous political policy‐maker.