Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
研究了在代理人避免弱占优策略的理性假设下，如何设计机制以保证理想性能，证明了第二价格拍卖和定价机制在私有价值拍卖和双边贸易中的最优性，并发现第二价格拍卖在相互依赖价值拍卖中也能实现收入最优。
We study the mechanism design problem of guaranteeing desirable performances whenever agents are rational in the sense of not playing weakly dominated strategies. We first provide an upper bound for the best performance we can guarantee among all feasible mechanisms. The bound is represented as the maximized value of the designer's objective subject to the inequality version of the standard envelope incentive conditions. We then prove the bound to be tight under certain conditions on the designer's prior over the agents' pay-off types in auction and bilateral-trade applications. In private-value auction and bilateral trade, the optimal mechanisms (a second-price auction and posted-price mechanism, respectively) satisfy dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, the classical notion of "robust" mechanisms. In an interdependent-value auction, we find that a second-price auction is optimal in revenue with interdependent values, which is neither dominant-strategy nor ex post incentive compatible, but satisfies the novel incentive compatibility introduced in this analysis.