Evolution of Impatience: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game
研究了在涉及惩罚威胁的博弈中，不耐烦可能具有演化优势，通过农夫-警长博弈的两群体模型，发现演化力量可能使一个群体变得不耐烦而另一个群体保持耐心，且效率与演化方向可能相反。
The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, often finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in games where equilibrium involves threat of punishment there are forces generating an evolutionary advantage to the impatient. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, efficiency may also favor impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the opposite direction.