CLAWBACK PROVISIONS IN REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
研究了195家房地产投资信托公司高管薪酬合同中追回条款的采用因素，发现追回条款与公司规模、杠杆、增长机会等正相关，并能提升市场与会计业绩。
Abstract Using a sample of 195 unique real estate investment trusts (REITs), we examine factors related to the adoption of clawback provisions within managerial compensation contracts. In general, we find strong and consistent empirical evidence that clawback provision are directly related to firm size, complexity, leverage, growth options, monitoring incentives, and CEO performance incentives. We also find that clawbacks are associated with enhanced market and accounting performance, with stronger performance relations observed for adoption decisions tied directly to regulatory mandates. In sum, we conclude compensation clawback provisions represent a value‐relevant, strategic governance mechanism for REITs.