Anatomy of a Contract Change
研究印度茶园采茶工合同变更，政府提高基础工资后，计件工资降低或不变，但下月产量反增20%-80%，随后数月增产完全逆转，表明非标准反应可能是短暂的。
We study a contract change for tea pluckers on an Indian plantation, with a higher government-stipulated baseline wage. Incentive piece rates were lowered or kept unchanged. Yet, in the following month, output increased by 20 to 80 percent. This response contradicts the standard model and several variants, is only partly explicable by greater supervision, and appears to be “behavioral.” But in subsequent months, the increase is comprehensively reversed. Though not an unequivocal indictment of “behavioral” models, these findings suggest that nonstandard responses may be ephemeral, and should ideally be tracked over an extended period of time.