Jointly Optimal Regulation of Bank Capital and Liquidity
研究存在金融摩擦的经济中，银行内生选择过高杠杆和期限错配，宏观审慎监管者可通过简单线性约束实现效率，并分析了巴塞尔III流动性覆盖率和净稳定资金比率的作用。
In an economy with financial frictions, banks endogenously choose excessive leverage and maturity mismatch in equilibrium, as they fail to internalize the risk of socially wasteful fire sales. Macroprudential regulators can achieve efficiency with simple linear constraints, which require less information than Pigouvian taxes. The liquidity coverage and net stable funding ratios of Basel III can implement efficiency. Additional microprudential regulation of leverage is required when bank failures are socially costly. Micro‐ and macroprudential rules are imperfect substitutes. Optimally, macroprudential policy reacts to systematic risk and credit conditions over the cycle, while microprudential policy reacts to systematic and idiosyncratic risk.