A Dynamic Analysis of the Market for Wide-Bodied Commercial Aircraft
用动态寡头模型分析商用飞机行业的定价、绩效和最优产业政策，发现无约束的马尔可夫完美均衡在福利上接近社会最优，而反垄断集中度限制反而会降低福利。
This paper uses an empirical dynamic oligopoly model of the commercial aircraft industry to analyse industry pricing, industry performance, and optimal industry policy. A novel feature of the model with respect to the previous literature is that entry, exit, prices, and quantities are endogenously determined in Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). We find that many unusual aspects of the aircraft data, such as high concentration and persistent pricing below static marginal cost, are explained by this model. We also find that the unconstrained MPE is quite efficient from a social perspective, providing only 10% less welfare on average than a social planner would obtain. Finally, we provide simulation evidence that an anti-trust policy in the form of a concentration restriction would be welfare reducing. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.