A Behavioral Model of the Popularity and Regulation of Demandable Liabilities
该模型用过度乐观解释活期存款合约的流行，发现即使存款人和银行所有者偏好相同，资本化机构也会服务过度乐观的存款人，且监管政策能提高存款人事前福利。
Overoptimism regarding one's ability to arrive early in a queue is shown to rationalize deposit contracts in which people can withdraw their funds on demand even if consumption takes place later. Capitalized institutions serving overoptimistic depositors emerge in equilibrium even if depositors and bank owners have identical preferences and investment opportunities. Consistent with the evidence, runs can lead people to move their deposits from one intermediary to another. Regulatory policies, including deposit insurance, minimum capital requirements and restrictions on the assets held by depository institutions can increase the ex ante welfare of depositors.