Nudging farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental schemes: the role of a collective bonus
研究显示，在农业环境计划中引入条件性集体奖金，可提高农民参与率和土地入保面积，同时降低总体预算成本。通过法国南部葡萄种植者的选择实验，发现该奖金提升了农民对他人参与的预期，从而推动环保社会规范，促进减少农药使用的农业实践。
This article shows that the introduction of a conditional collective bonus in an agri-environmental scheme (AES) can improve farmers' participation and increase land enrolment for lower overall budgetary costs. This monetary bonus is paid in addition to the usual AES payment if a given threshold is reached in terms of aggregate farmer participation. Using a choice experiment, we estimate the preferences of winegrowers in the South of France for such a bonus. We show that it contributes to increased expectations of farmers on others' participation, therefore shifting a pro-environmental social norm and favouring the adoption of less pesticide-intensive farming practices.