Innovation by Heterogeneous Leaders*
构建了一个熊彼特增长模型，其中领导者与追随者进行研发，领导者质量领先程度不同导致利润流不同，发现质量领先越大的领导者研发投入越小，且补贴追随者研发可促进领导者总体研发。
Abstract We develop a Schumpeterian growth model in which leaders and followers conduct research and development (R&D) activities and in which leaders have different‐sized quality leads over their followers, and thus have different profit flows. We show that leaders with larger quality leads make smaller R&D investments; this result is consistent with the actual behaviors of some previous leader firms, such as Sony and Eastman–Kodak. Moreover, we show that subsidizing the R&D of followers can promote the aggregate R&D of leaders, because promotion of followers' R&D decreases (increases) the number of leaders with larger (smaller) quality leads and smaller (larger) R&D investments.