Credit Market Frictions and Coessentiality of Money and Credit
研究了信贷市场摩擦如何导致货币与信用同时使用才能提升福利，对高生产率借款人因逆向选择而受信贷约束时愿意持有货币的现象进行了分析。
Abstract We explore how credit market frictions matter for the coessentiality of money and credit. Limited commitment calls for credit limits that are tailored according to borrowers' productivity. Under an adverse selection problem caused by asymmetric information, however, lenders impose the credit limit of the low‐productivity borrower onto the high‐productivity borrower. If productivities differ sufficiently between borrowers, the high‐productivity borrower is credit‐constrained and is willing to hold money to compensate for the deficiency of their credit limit, whereas the low‐productivity borrower is not. This implies the coessentiality of money and credit in the sense that their simultaneous use improves welfare.