The Impact of Switching Costs on the Outsourcing of Knowledge‐Intensive Business Processes
研究了转换成本如何影响知识密集型商业服务外包中的供应商选择和合同效率，发现竞争性招标虽能选出好供应商但合同效率低，而由客户定合同条款则效率高但选择差。
ABSTRACT This study examines the impact of switching costs on vendor selection and contract efficiency in the outsourcing of knowledge‐intensive business services (KIBS). We show that under most plausible scenarios in KIBS outsourcing, there is an intrinsic tension between vendor selection and contract efficiency: in the process in which the winning vendor's bid constitutes the terms of the contract between client and vendor (e.g., competitive bidding), there is good selection but contract inefficiency (positive information rent paid by the client). If, by contrast, the client establishes the contract terms, then its performance yields contract efficiency but poor selection. We also highlight the implications of performance metrics for contract design in KIBS outsourcing.