Supply‐ versus Demand‐Side Policies in the Presence of Carbon Leakage and the Green Paradox
研究气候联盟在碳泄漏和资源可耗尽条件下，如何通过可信的供给侧政策公告延迟外国排放，并推导出消费者税和生产者税的最优组合，发现税收份额随时间变化。
Abstract We consider a climate coalition that seeks to reduce global emissions in the presence of carbon leakage and resource exhaustibility. We show that a credible announcement of future unilateral supply‐side policies delays foreign emissions, and we derive the optimal combination of consumer taxes and producer taxes when we consider leakages from free riders, both within periods and across periods. The tax shares generally differ over time. A decline in the present value of the social cost of carbon over time supports a time path where the consumers’ tax share of the total carbon tax also declines over time. We illustrate our findings with a numerical model.