稳健的社会决策

Robust Social Decisions

American Economic Review · 2016
被引 2
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

提出并操作化了一套规范原则,用于在个体信念不精确且异质、同时存在品味或利益冲突时指导社会决策,通过调整帕累托原则来适应信念不精确,并刻画了尊重该原则的社会偏好。

Abstract

We propose and operationalize normative principles to guide social decisions when individuals potentially have imprecise and heterogeneous beliefs, in addition to conflicting tastes or interests. To do so, we adapt the standard Pareto principle to those preference comparisons that are robust to belief imprecision and characterize social preferences that respect this robust principle. We also characterize a suitable restriction of this principle. The former principle provides stronger guidance when it can be satisfied; when it cannot, the latter always provides minimal guidance.

稳健社会决策帕累托原则信念不精确异质性信念