Marking to Market versus Taking to Market
研究企业私下最优的会计计量规则如何与公司治理及资产二级市场流动性相互作用，发现市场价值会计被过度使用，导致流动性枯竭和价格信号失效，加剧代理问题。
Building on the idea that accounting matters for corporate governance, this paper studies the equilibrium interaction between the measurement rules that firms find privately optimal, firms’ governance, and the liquidity in the secondary market for their assets. This equilibrium approach reveals an excessive use of market-value accounting: corporate performance measures rely excessively on the information generated by other firms’ asset sales and insufficiently on the realization of a firm’s own capital gains. This dries up market liquidity and reduces the informativeness of price signals, thereby making it more costly for firms to overcome their agency problems.