AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF UNCERTAINTY IN COORDINATION GAMES
通过实验室实验，比较了经济基本面不确定性（全局博弈）和玩家数量不确定性（泊松博弈）对协调博弈中参与者行为的影响，发现后者影响更大且更符合理论预测。
Abstract Global games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indeterminacy in Common Knowledge Coordination games. The present study investigates in a controlled setup, using as controls Common Knowledge games, whether idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals (Global games) or uncertainty about the number of actual players (Poisson games) may influence subjects' behavior. We find that uncertainty about the number of actual players has more influence on subjects' behavior than idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals. Furthermore, subjects' behavior under Poisson population‐size uncertainty is closer to the respective theoretical prediction than subjects' behavior under idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals.