Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO Compensation when Managers Are Loss Averse
分析了管理者损失厌恶时的最优薪酬合同，通过校准595位CEO的数据，发现该模型能解释期权持有和高底薪，并推导出最优合同在中等和高业绩时递增且凸性，低业绩时跳降至最低支付。
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes optimal executive compensation contracts when managers are loss averse. We calibrate a stylized principal‐agent model to the observed contracts of 595 CEOs and show that this model can explain observed option holdings and high base salaries remarkably well for a range of parameterizations. We also derive and calibrate the general shape of the optimal contract that is increasing and convex for medium and high outcomes and that drops discontinuously to the lowest possible payout for low outcomes. Finally, we identify the critical features of the loss‐aversion model that render optimal contracts convex.