Monopolistic nonlinear pricing with consumer entry
研究了消费者在了解自身偏好类型前需支付进入成本时，垄断企业的最优非线性定价合同，发现与无进入成本情形相比，质量扭曲和市场排斥减少，排序更可能发生，且在某些条件下可实现生产效率。
We consider consumer entry in the canonical monopolistic nonlinear pricing model ( Mussa and Rosen 1978) wherein consumers learn their preference 'types' after incurring privately known entry costs. We show that by taking into account consumer entry, the nature of optimal nonlinear pricing contracts changes significantly: compared to the benchmark without costly entry, in our model both quality distortion and market exclusion are reduced, sorting is more likely, and whenever bunching occurs, the bunching interval is necessarily smaller. Additionally, under certain conditions the monopoly solution may even achieve the first best (i.e., production efficiency). We also demonstrate that the optimal monopoly solutions can be ranked according to inverse hazard rate functions of the entry cost, which suggests an interesting dynamic for monopolistic nonlinear pricing with consumer entry.