Rivalry and uncertainty in complementary investments with dynamic market sharing
研究收入与投资成本不确定性以及非抢先式双寡头竞争如何影响两种互补投入的投资时机，发现事前和事后收入市场份额对企业行为有重要影响，领导者遵循同步投资惯例，而追随者更可能异步投资。
We study the effects of revenue and investment cost uncertainty, as well non-preemption duopoly competition, on the timing of investments in two complementary inputs, where either spillover-knowledge is allowed or proprietary-knowledge holds. We find that the ex-ante and ex-post revenue market shares play a very important role in firms’ behavior. When competition is considered, the leader’s behavior departs from that of the monopolist firm of Smith (Ind Corp Change 14:639–650, 2005). The leader is justified in following the conventional wisdom (i.e., synchronous investments are more likely), whereas, the follower’s behavior departs from that of the conventional wisdom (i.e., asynchronous investments are more likely).