Optimal Redistribution with Endogenous Social Norms
研究了社会规范如何影响再分配政策，发现当社会规范成为参与者的收益或成本时，最优参与税率通常低于无规范情形，且从低参与均衡转向高参与均衡可能实现帕累托改进。
Abstract In this paper, we examine the effect of social norms on redistributive policies, where social norms are reflected in the degree of work participation among the different skill classes. Participation is driven both by the material incentives and heterogeneous preferences for leisure of each skill class, and by an endogenous social norm. Results for optimal redistributive taxation show that when the social norm enters as a benefit or cost for participants, participation taxes are generally lower than in its absence. Multiple participation equilibria can occur, and an engineered shift from a low‐ to a high‐participation equilibrium can be Pareto‐improving in the long run.