The perceived credibility of forward-looking performance disclosures
研究了投资者如何感知年报叙述部分中前瞻性业绩披露的可信度，发现公司会在发债或传递坏消息时增加此类披露，而投资者对披露的依赖程度随审计后盈利质量提高而增强。
We investigate the credibility of forward-looking performance disclosures (FLPDs) in the narrative sections of annual reports, as perceived by investors. Our proxy for these disclosures is an index of statements about future performance. We find that companies issue more FLPDs when raising debt or conveying bad news in the financial statements. In the presence of these managerial incentives, investor reliance on FLPDs increases with the quality of earnings reported in the audited financial statements. Our results suggest that firms derive a benefit in terms of higher credibility for their narrative disclosures from having a reputation for high quality earnings.