What Drives a Firm's Choice of Product Recall Remedy? The Impact of Remedy Cost, Product Hazard, and the CEO
研究了企业选择产品召回补救措施的决定因素，发现补救成本高时企业避免全面补救，产品危害严重时更可能全面补救，且CEO的个人财务激励（如现金薪酬、股权激励和任期）会影响这一决策。
When product recalls occur, companies provide corrective or compensation measures to consumers for the defective products they have purchased. These remedies directly affect consumers and the effectiveness of recall. This article examines the determinants of remedy choices with a theoretical framework rooted in the basic trade-off between remedy cost and consumer harm. In addition to recall and company characteristics, the authors also consider the impact of the CEO's personal incentives. Using recalls issued by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, the authors find that companies prefer to avoid full remedy when remedy cost is high, yet they are more likely to provide full remedy for more severe product hazards. The results show that CEOs’ personal interests interfere with remedy decisions: full remedy is less likely when the CEO receives greater cash compensation or less equity incentive, and when the CEO has longer tenure in the position. Importantly, the CEO's financial interests further moderate the effects of remedy cost and consumer harm. The findings have important implications for recall strategy, consumer welfare, public policy, and leadership ethics.